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Miller v. Miller: The Safety Belt Defense 
JoHN J. KrRc:HER 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 
Introduction 
In Miller v. Miller1 the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina rejected the safety belt 
defense. The purpose of this paper is to 
carefully analyze that decision and point 
to its errors lest other courts, looking no 
further and relying upon it as authority, 
fall into similar error. 
Had the North Carolina court made a 
more detailed analysis, it would have 
found logical solutions to the problems it 
saw in the application of the defense. The 
arguments raised by the authorities upon 
which the court relied most heavily, and 
which shaped the final outcome of the 
decision, have been shown to be without 
foundation. 2 
Negligence Per Se 
In Miller, the plaintiff was a passenger 
in his own car. It entered a sharp cu'rve, 
left the road and overturned. The plaintiff 
received a back injury as a result of the 
collision and commenced an action against 
the driver of his car. As part of her answer, 
the defendant alleged that the vehicle was 
equipped with safety belts and the plain-
tiff did not use the belt that was available. 
She further alleged that the plaintiff would 
not have been injured if he had used the 
belt. The trial court struck the defense 
and an appeal was taken. 
In its consideration of the safety belt 
defense, the court first looked at its state 
safety belt statute. 3 The question was 
whether the statute made the failure to use 
an available belt contributory negligence 
as a matter of law. The North Carolina 
statute, like those in many other states,4 
only requires the installation of safety belts 
1160 SE2d 65 (NC 1968). 
efor a critical analysis of the arguments raised 
against the application of the safety belt defense, 
see DRI Monograph, "The Seat Belt Defense" 
(Sept 1967) . 
oNC Gen Stat § 20-135.2 (Supp 1965). 
•For a list of the state statutes requiring installa-
tion of au to safety belts, see "The Seat Belt De-
fense" note 2 supra at 21. 
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in all autos sold after a certain time. The 
court concluded that a mere installation 
act could not be considered a safety statute, 
making non usc of available belts con tribu-
torily negligent per se. This conclusion 
follows the reasoning of other courts which 
have considered the subject and agrees 
with the reasoning of the proponents of 
the defense.'' 
The court then turned to consider 
whether the nonuse of an available safety 
belt could be considered as contributory 
negligence under the standards of the com-
mon law. It stated: 
The conclusion that a motorist is negli-
gent whenever he rides upon the highway 
with his seat belt unbuckled can be sup-
ported only by the premise that no rea--
sonably prudent person would travel the 
highway without using an available scat 
belt. If this be true, every failure to usc 
an available seat belt would be negligence 
per se .... 0 
The fallacies in this statement are obvious. 
The proponents of the defense do not 
claim that it is negligent per se to fail to 
use an available safety belt or that a rea-
sonably prudent person would never travel 
the highway without one.' The infinite 
variety of situations which may arise to 
affect human behavior makes it impossible 
'-lei at 12. 
nNote I supra at GR. 
;"The Scat Belt Defense" note 2 supra at 12. 
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to fix definite rules, in advance, for all 
conceivable human conduct.8 This is why 
the standard of the reasonable man of ordi-
nary prudence was adopted at common 
law. It is true that courts have, from time 
to time, declared certain conduct to be 
negligent per se. For example, at least one 
court has held that the driver of a moving 
vehicle who falls asleep at tlie wheel is 
negligent as a matter of law.9 However, 
as the court in Miller failed to recognize, 
there may be situations in which a reason-
ably prudent person would travel upon the 
highway without using an available belt. 
A person whose physician advised against 
such use because of recent abdominal sur-
gery or pregnancy could hardly be consid-
ered prudent if that advice were disregard-
ed. In the safety belt situation, it seems 
more workable to leave the determination 
of contributory negligence with the jury, 
under the standard of care of the reason-
able man of ordinary prudence, than to 
set a hard, fast rule of conduct to which 
there could be so many exceptions. For as 
one author has stated: 
Such rules may be useful to fix a stand-
ard for the usual, normal case, but they 
are a hindrance to any just decision in the 
large number of unusual situations pre-
senting new factors which may affect the 
standard. A standard which requires only 
conduct proportionate to the circumstances 
and the risk seldom, if ever, can be made 
a matter of absolute rule.w 
Safety Belt Acceptance 
The court digressed from its considera-
tion of contributory negligence for a time 
to discuss public acceptance of safety belts. 
It quoted, with apparent approval, the 
statement of a student law review author: 
[T]he issue of the social utility of the 
use of seat belts is definitely not clarified 
in the minds of the public and the doubts 
remain as to whether seat belts cause in-
jury, and the real usefulness of the seat 
belt in preventing injuries has not become 
public knowledge. . . .n 
The court's acceptance of such a statement 
at face value is almost as incomprehensible 
BProsser, Torts § 32 at 153 (3d ed 1964). 
9Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 
Wis2d 91, 118 NW2d 140 (1962). 
JOProsser, note 8 supra § 37 at 212. 
uRothe, "Seat Belt Negligence in Automobik 
Accidents," 1967 Wis L Rev 288, 296. 
as the 'reason which led the student author 
to make it. One would have to be deaf 
and blind to be unaware that the public 
has been exposed to one of the greatest 
safety educational campaigns on record re-
garding the effectiveness of safety belts: 
A person cannot listen to the radio or 
watch television for long without having 
some form of "Buckle Up For Safety" mes-
sage presented to him. The American 
.Medi.:;al Association, National Safety Coun-
cil, General Federatior\ of Women's Clubs, 
Auto Industries Highway Safety Commit-
tee, numerous unions, professional socie-
ties, as well as other service clubs and 
civic groups have been active in campaigns 
directed at public acceptance and use of 
safety belts. 1 2 
Evidence that the public does appreciate 
the effectiveness of safety belts comes from 
a recent survey of over 1,700,000 cars con-
ducted by the Auto Industries Highway 
Safety CommitteeP In the cars which had 
belts installed, only 10.3 per cent of the 
persons surveyed said that they never used 
belts under any circumstances. While the 
responses of the persons who claimed belt 
use some or all of the time may be ques-
tioned, such a response does indicate that 
those persons recognized the value of belt 
use. 
In view of all of this it seems strange 
that the court would accept an unsupport-
ed statement that the real usefulness of 
safety belts has not become public knowl-
edge. 
The court seemed impressed by a Na-
tional Safety Council estimate which set 
the use of safety belts by all passenger car 
occupants at between 20 and 25 percent. 
"If the foregoing statistics be correct," the 
court stated, "the average man does not 
customarily use his seat belt."14 Statistics 
on cigarette sales since the publication of 
the Surgeon General's report on the con-
firmed link between cigarette smoking and 
lung cancer also seem to indicate that the 
average man is not heeding the warning 
contained therein. It is just this propensity 
of the average man to adopt an "it can't 
happen to me" approach toward his own 
safety that gives strength to 'the view that 
1216 Am Jur Proof of Facts, "Seat Belt Acci-
dents," § 4 at 357 (1965). 
t3Sixth Annual Seat Belt Installation and Use 
Survey, Auto Industries Highway Safety Committee 
(1966). 
14Note 1 supra at 69. 
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community customs and usages often result 
from the kind of inadvertence, carelessness, 
indifference and corner-cutting that is nor-
mally associated with negligence.15 Custom 
is not conclusive simply because it is a 
custom; it must meet the challenge of 
"learned reason," and be given only the 
evidentiary weight that the situation de-
serves.16 If this were not the case, the 
North Carolina court could have decided 
the issue simply by determining how many 
of its number customarily made use of 
their safety belts. 
Safety Belt Effectiveness 
The court next turned its consideration 
to the question of the effectiveness of safe-
ty belts in preventing injury and death 
resulting from auto accidents. It began 
with the following statement: 
Many people fail to use them because of 
the fear of entrapment in a burning or 
submerged car. [emphasis added)17 
The writer is unaware of any authoritative 
survey of public opinion which would sup-
port such an unqualified statement. Like-
wise, the authority cited by the court for 
this premise18 is silent as to the source of 
such a general statement of fact. However, 
such a fear is not founded in fact, irrespec-
tive of whether it does exist or is as wide-
spread as believed by the court. The report 
of a study on this subject19 indicates that 
fire occurs in only two-tenths of one per-
cent of all injury producing _accidents, and 
submersion in only three-tenths of one per-
cent. It also noted that a person wearing 
a safety belt may have a better chance for 
survival in those types of accidents. The 
report pointed to the fact that a belted 
person stands a better chance of remaining 
conscious after the collision and thereby 
is better able to remove himself from dan-
ger. 
Throughout the decision the court 
quotes at great length, and with apparent 
approval, from an article highly critical of 
the safety belt defense written by a plain-
15Prosser, note 8 supra § 33 at 170. 
16Ibid. 
nNote I supra at 69. 
18Annot., "Automobile Occupants' Failure To 
Use Seat Belt as Contributory Negligence," 15 
ALR3d 1428, 1430 (1967). 
'"Gagen, "Seat Belts: No Longer Why, But Why 
Not?." 38 Today's Health No 7 at 26 (July 1960). 
tiffs' attorney, J. Murry Kleist-2° In dis-
cussing the effectiveness of safety belts, the 
court quotes Kleist's statement that belts 
are of limited value and may cause more 
in juries than they prevent. Kleist, in turn, 
cites three studies to support that position. 
Two of these studies21 discuss the medical 
aspects of the safety belt as a cause of in-
jury. These studies, contrary to the posi-
tion Kleist attributed to them, conclude 
that while safety belts may cause some in-
jury, usually in high speed collisions, those 
injuries would have been more severe if 
belts had not been worn. In fact, the au-
thor of one of the studies cited by Kleist 
states: 
It does not reasonably follow that the use 
of restraining devices should be discarded 
because they can cause injury. This 
blanket condemnation is filVored by those 
who are uninformed or do not choose to 
use seat belts.zz 
Kleist's third authority23 based his conclu-
sions as to the limited effectiveness of safe-
ty belts upon experiments involving simu-
lated collisions conducted prior to 1958. 
The early origin of this study and the fact 
that numerous, more recent studies24 have 
come to completely opposite results point 
to its limited usefulness. Kleist did not see 
fit to distinguish the more recent studies 
or, for that matter, the fact that the organ-
ized Plaintiffs' Bar has advocated the full 
use of safety belts.25 
It would seem strange that thirty-two 
states and the federal government would 
requi1 e the installation of safety belts in 
all new autos26 if, as claimed by Kleist, 
they were of limited value or could cause 
more rather than less injuries in many 
crash conditions. In fact, a recent report 
of a 15-year study conducted by the Auto-
motive Crash Injury Research (ACIR) of 
Cornell University claims that the risk of 
zoKleist, "The Seat Belt Defense - An Exercise 
In Sophistry," 18 Hastings L J 613 (1967). 
21See Rubovits, "Traumatic Rupture of the 
Pregnant Uterus from 'Seat Belt' Injury," 90 Amer 
J Obst & Gyec 828 (1964); Fisher, "Injury Pro-
duced by Seat Belts, Report of 2 Cases," 7 J of 
Occupational Medicine 2ll (1965). 
22Fishcr, note 21 supra. 
23White, "The Role of Safety Belts in the Motor-
ist's Safety," 9 Clinical Orthopedics 317 (1957). 
24"The Seat Belt Defense" note 2 supra, Bibliog-
raphy at 37. 
zoATLA Monograph, "Stop Murder By Motor" 
at 9 (.Jan 1966). 
zs"The Seat Belt Defense" note 2 supra at 6 
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death alone for unbelted motorists is 30 
percent greater and that the risk of death 
or serious injury combined is about 50 per-
cent greaterY 
If safety belts are not effective in pre-
venting injury and death resulting from 
motor vehicle accidents, then the National 
Safety Council, American Medical Associ-
ation, American Trial Lawyers Association, 
Defense Research Institute, the Congress 
of the United States, the legislatures of 
thirty-two states, numerous researchers, as 
well as many other organizations which 
promote the installation and use of safety 
belts, are either incompetent or the naive 
victims of one of the greatest hoaxes ever 
perpetrated on the American public. 
In the final analysis, a review of all the 
studies of the effectiveness of safety belts 
supports the position taken by the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court: 
While it is apparent that . . . statistics 
cannot be used to predict the extent or 
gravity of injuries resulting from particu-
lar automobile accidents involving persons 
using seat belts as compared to those who 
are not using them, it is obvious that, on 
the average, persons using seat belts are 
less likely to sustain injury and, if injured, 
the injuries are likely to be less serious.2s 
The Reasonable Man 
The court in Miller returned to its con-
sideration of contributory negligence and 
safety belts to determine if a person failing 
to make use of an available belt could be 
held guilty of contributory negligence un-
der the standard of the common law - the 
reasonable man of ordinary prudence. It 
concluded that if such a situation would 
exist: 
It would, however, have to be a situa-
tion in which the plaintiff, with prior 
knowledge of a specific hazard - one not 
generally associated with highway travel 
and one from which a seat belt would have 
protected him - had failed or refused to 
fasten his seat belt.29 
The court found, that absent such a situ-
ation, there would be no standards by 
which it could be said that the use of safety 
27Reported in the Milwaukee Sentinel (Apr 19 
1968). 
2BBentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis2d 362, 386, 149 
NW2d 626, 640 (1967). 
29Note 1 supra at 70. 
belts was required on one trip and not 
another. 
Applying the Common Law Standard 
In view of the court's reluctance to find, 
as did the Wisconsin court, 30 that there is 
a common law duty based upon standards 
of ordinary care to wear available safety 
belts, it is important to analyze the safety 
belt situation in relation to the common 
law standard. At common law, the plain-
tiff is required to conform to the same 
general standard of conduct as would be 
followed by a reasonable man of ordinary 
prudence under similar circumstances.31 
This is at best a shorthand method of de-
termining whether particular conduct is 
contributorily negligent because more 
comes into the bargain before such a de-
termination can be made. In determining 
what a reasonable man would have done, 
the reasonableness of the risk which the 
plaintiff incurred by his conduct is judged 
by weighing the importance of the interest 
he. i~ seeking t? advance against the prob-
ability that his conduct may cause him 
harm and the probable severity of that 
harm.32 
Previous discussion shows the effective-
ness of safety belts and that a person in-
volved in an auto accident is less likely 
to sustain _serious injury if he is using a 
belt. Prevwus discussion also indicates 
that these facts have been made known to 
the motoring public. Therefore, in a safety 
belt situation, the question becomes wheth-
er a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, 
considering the probability of being in-
volved in an auto accident and the prob-
able severity of harm to himself as a result 
of such an accident, would make use of an 
available safety belt for his own protection. 
Accident Probability 
Is the probability of being involved in 
an accident on any given trip so great that, 
standing alone, the reasonable man of ordi-
nary prudence, after considering the prob-
ability, would use an available seat belt? 
An unqualified "yes" answer to such a 
question would only beg it. It is possible 
for a person to be found guilty of con-
tributory negligence for failing to take pre-
soBentzler v. Braun, note 29 supra. 
3IProsser, note 8 supra § 64 at 429. 
32lbid. 
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cautions to avoid a possible future harm.33 
However, a person is not expected to guard 
against harm from those events which it 
is not reasonable to anticipate, or which 
are so unlikely to happen that the risk, al-
though recognizable, would commonly be 
disregarded.34 If the question is considered 
objectively, one must admit that the prob-
ability of being involved in an auto acci-
dent on any given trip is appreciable but 
not great. Statistics for the year 1966 indi-
cate that there were approximately 96,000,-
000 registered motor vehicles, 102,000,000 
licensed drivers, and 2,000,000 persons suf-
fering death or personal injury as the result 
of auto accidents.35 Thus, while accidents, 
injuries and deaths may be on the increase, 
our highways still present a relatively safe 
and convenient means of travel.36 There-
fore, it would seem that, standing alone, 
the probability of being involved in an 
auto accident is not great enough to cause 
the reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
to fasten his safety belt. 
Although the probability of being in-
volved in an auto accident on any given 
trip is not great, it would seem unwise to 
say that the probability is not appreciable. 
State and federal legislation for safer roads, 
cars, driver education, periodic auto inspec-
tion, implied consent laws, stricter licens-
ing policies, and a multitude of other· auto 
safety oriented legislation all point to the 
growing concern over auto accidents and 
their toll in loss of life as well as human 
suffering and economic loss. The auto ac-
cident and its effects have indeed become 
a national problem. 
Probable Severity of Harm 
The Kleist article, previously mentioned, 
criticized the safety belt defense on two 
basic points. He contends that the remote 
probability of being involved in an auto 
accident and the fact that a person has the 
right to assume that others will exercise 
proper care, removed the need to take pro-
tective measures such as fastening the safe-
ty belt. In Miller, the court also made 
note of the rule in North Carolina, similar 
to other states, that a person is entitled to 
33Restatement (Second) Torts, § 466, comment g 
at 514 (1965). 
3<Prosser, note 8 supra § 31 at 149. 
35National Safety Council, "Accident Facts" at 
40 (1967 ed). 
3GRothe, note II supra at 295. 
assume others will use due care for his 
safety and their own.37 
Arguments such as these disregard sev-
eral important factors. If a risk is an 
appreciable one and the possible conse-
quences are serious, mathematical pro~­
ability alone does not control the determi-
nation of whether or not the risk can be 
reasonably run. As the gravity of the pos-
sible harm increases, the apparent likeli-
hood of the occurrence of the harm need 
be correspondingly less.38 As noted earlier, 
although the probability of being involved 
in an accident on any given auto trip is 
not high, it certainly is appr.eciable. The 
grave consequences of auto accidents in-
volving high-powered automobiles, capable 
of great speeds, are matters of common 
knowledge of which the courts have taken 
judicial notice. 30 
Similarly, the position that one may as-
sume that others will exercise proper care 
is not absolute. Generally, when the risk 
is slight, a person may proceed under this 
assumption; however, when the risk be-
comes serious, either due to the gravity of 
possible harm or the likelihood of its 
occurrence, reasonable care may demand 
that occasional negligence, common among 
all men, be anticipated.40 
The argument that one need not use an 
available safety belt because he may assume 
that others will exercise proper care like-
wise presupposes that all auto accidents 
are caused by the negligence of some per-
son other than the plaintiff. This is obvi-
ously not the case. 
Recent publicity campaigns by the Na-
tional Safety Council and· other groups 
have advised motorists to "watch out for 
the other guy," and have emphasized the 
fact that a motorist should not rely on the 
assumption that others will obey the law. 
Advertisements in the press and on radio 
and television have warned motorists that 
if they do not take precautions and choose 
to rely on the fact that they have the right 
of way, they may be in the right, but "dead 
right!" All of the educational efforts of 
safety groups would seem to be evidence 
of the fact that a reasonable man of ordi-
nary prudence should appreciate the risk 
involved in automobile travel. Similar 
3<Note I supra at 70. 
3BProsser, note 8 supra § 31 at 151. 
39£.g., McConville v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 
15 Wis2d 374, 378, 113 NW2d 14, 19 (1962). 
4!>J>rosser, note 1 supra § 33 at 174. 
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educational efforts regarding the effective-
ness of safety belt use would also be evi-
dence of the fact that a reasonable man 
of ordinary prudence should realize that 
he is much more safe and less likely to 
suffer serious injury if he wears his safety 
belt.41 
Although the final determination of 
whether or not a reasonable man of ordi-
nary prudence would use an available 
safety belt under the circumstances of the 
particular case is for the jury, a defendant 
should be allowed to plead and prove that 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence for failing to use an available 
belt. As was stated by the Wisconsin court: 
While we agree with those courts that. 
have concluded that it is not negligent 
per se to fail to use seat belts where the 
only statutory standard is one that requires 
the installation of the seat belt in the 
vehicle, we conclude that there is a duty, 
based on the common law standard of 
ordinary care, to use available seat belts 
independent of any statutory mandate.42 
This argument is supported by the fact 
that the legislatures of five states,43 in en-
acting seat belt installation statutes, found 
it necessary to provide that the failure to 
use safety belts shall not be considered as 
negligence, or that proof of the lack of 
their use is inadmissible in any civil action 
seeking damages for personal injuries. 
While the proponents of the safety belt 
defense do not claim that it is negligent 
per se to fail to use an available safety 
belt, they do claim that absent known con-
ditions making it imprudent to use belts, 
a reasonable man of ordinary prudence 
would use them in every situation. 
Causation 
The North Carolina court expressed con-
cern over the ability of litigants in a case 
involving safety belts to be able to present 
competent proof that the injuries would 
or would not have occurred had belts been 
worn. It stated: 
Should the use of seat belts be required 
by law, there is little doubt that the testi· 
41Bentzler v. Braun, note 29 supra. 
42ld at 385, 149 NW2d at 640. 
43lowa Code § 321.445 (1966); Me Rev Stat 
Ann C 29 § 1368A (Supp 1966); Minn Stat § 
169.685 (Supp 1966); Tenn Gode Ann § 59-930 
(Supp 1966); Va Code Ann § 46.1·309.1 (Supp 
1967) 0 
mony of professional safety experts would 
be made available to both plaintiff and 
defendant. Notwithstanding, it would 
probably remain a matter of conjecture to 
what extent a motorist's injuries are at-
tributable to his failure to use a seat belt 
and whether, had it been used, other and 
different injuries would have resulted.H 
Earlier in its opinion, the court quoted a 
similar statement by Kleist: 
In any given collision, no doctor can say 
exactly what injuries would have been 
suffered had the victim been wearing a 
seat belt as compared to those he suffered 
without it.•5 
The sciences of medicine and accident re-
construction are not strangers to the court-
room. It is at best highly speculative for 
an attorney or court, not skilled or school-
ed in these sciences, to attempt to surmise 
what experts will be able to establish after 
having studied the physical evidence. In a 
case involving a low-speed, rear-end colli-
sion, would it be a matter of conjecture 
for a qualified expert to say that, had an 
available lap belt and shoulder harness 
combination been worn, the plaintiff 
would not have struck his head on the 
windshield, dashboard, or any other object 
within the vehicle? In a case in which all 
of the occupants of a vehicle are belted . 
except one, and in which that unbelted 
person is ejected from the car, sustaining 
serious injury while all other occupants go 
uninjured, would it be a matter of con-
jecture for a qualified expert to say that 
had an available belt been used the un-
b~lted person would have escaped injury? 
Research indicates that scientists can de-
termine whether injuries and death could 
have been prevented in accidents had belts 
been employed.46 Unquestionably, cases 
will arise in which experts will be unable 
to determine what effect safety belt use 
would have had in preventing injury. In 
such a case the trial court could prevent 
the jury from considering the safety belt 
defense. Proper instructions could be given 
••Note I supra at 73. 
4f•Kleist, note 20 supra at 615. 
4tl£.g., Huelke & Gikas, "Causes of Deaths in 
Automobile Accidents," 203 JA:\fA liOO (Mar 
25 196R) reports a study of 177 motor vehicle 
accident deaths. The researchers concluded that 
40% of those killed would have sun·h·ed if lap 
belts were worn and an additional 13% if lap 
belt and shoulder harness combinations were used 
by the persons killed. 
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to caution the jury that the proof was in-
sufficient for them to consider the matter. 
However, in a case such as Miller, where 
the court is only considering whether the 
defense asserted in the pleadings is sus-
ceptible to demurrer, the propriety of a 
court speculating as to what competent ex-
perts could establish is highly questionable. 
Contributory Negligence As A 
Complete Bar 
Finally, the North Carolina court ex-
pressed concern over the use of the safety 
belt defense, because it felt that it would 
be harsh and unsound for a plaintiff to 
be denied all recovery merely because of 
his failure to fasten a safety belt. In North 
Carolina causal contributory negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff is a complete bar · 
to his recovery. 
In states such as North Carolina in 
which causal contributory negligence is a 
complete bar to recovery, some injustice 
may result if a plaintiff is totally denied 
recovery for the failure to use an available 
safety belt. This would be true in those 
cases in which the plaintiff suffers injuries 
which could have been prevented through 
safety belt use and those which could not 
have been so prevented. The solution to 
this problem may lie in the application of 
the doctrine of avoidable consequences. 
This doctrine denies recovery to the plain-
tiff for those damages which could have 
been avoided through reasonable con-
duct.<7 
A distinction has been made, however, 
and it is generally held that contributory 
negligence operates when the plaintiff's 
conduct, prior to the accident, caused or 
contributed to his injuries. Avoidable con-
sequences comes into play after the legal 
wrong has been committed, but while some 
damage may still be prevented.48 In Miller, 
the court noted this distinction and ex-
pressed the view that the safety belt situa-
tion does not fit the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences because the failure to fasten 
the safety belt occurs before the negligent 
act which causes the collision. 
However, a telling argument has been 
made for the position that the distinction 
between contributory negligence and avoid-
able consequences is artificial and places 
too much importance on the time of im-
<7Prosser, note 8 supra § 64 at 433. 
4Slbid. 
pact as a cut-off point where one stops and 
the other begins.<9 It has been suggested 
that the better approach would be to allow 
the plaintiff to recover for those damages 
which he could not have prevented and 
to bar recovery for those damages which 
could have been prevented without the 
formality of making a distinction between 
the application of contributory negligence 
and avoidable consequences. 50 
One author has suggested that avoidable 
consequences could be applied to a seat 
belt situation. 51 This possibility was also 
recognized in the case of Kavanagh v. 
Butorac. 52 In that case the court noted the 
pre- and post-accident distinction regard-
ing contributory negligence and avoidable 
consequences. However, the court stated: 
We recognize the possibility of the doctrine 
(avoidable consequences) applying in 
some future date and in some matter 
where the circumstances are clearer than 
the instance case in showing that some 
part of the injuries would not have oc-
curred except for the fact that plaintiff 
failed to avoid the consequences of the 
tort by fastening his seat belt.53 
The reason why the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences has never been applied to a 
situation involving pre-accident conduct on 
the part of the plaintiff may lie in the fact 
that safety belts present the first unique 
method by which affirmative action may 
prevent injuries as opposed to merely pre-
venting the occurrence which produces 
them. This rule and its application to a 
safety belt situation will produce a more 
equitable result than would the applica-
tion of a rule which would completely bar 
recovery. The latter approach places too 
much emphasis on unwarranted formalism 
and gives importance to the time of injury, 
which really should have no importance in 
fact or law. 
In the recent Illinois decision of M aunt 
v. McClellan"• the court adopted the ap-
proach that there is a duty based upon 
common law standards of ordinary care to 
use available safety belts independent of 
any statutory mandate. It recognized that 
•nid at 434. 
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5tLevine, "Legal Problems Arising from Failure 
to Wear Seat Belts," Transcript ATLA 20th An-
nual Convention, 519 at 527 (1966). 
52221 NE2d 824 (Ind App 1966). 
sard at 830. 
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the use or nonuse of safety belts, and ex-
pert testimony in relation thereto, is a mat-
ter which the trier of fact may consider, 
together with all other facts in evidence, in 
arriving at its conclusion as to whether the 
plaintiff has exercised due care, .not only 
to avoid injury to himself, but to mitigate 
any injury he would be likely to sustain. 
However, the court held that the seat belt 
consideration should be limited to the issue 
of damages only and should not be con-
sidered by the trier of fact in determining 
the liability issue. Unlike the North Caro-
lina court, it saw no problem in the appli-
cation of the safety belt defense to this 
issue. 
Conclusion 
The proponents of the safety belt de-
fense do not claim that the complete use 
of belts would eliminate all injuries and 
deaths from motor vehicle accidents. They 
do claim, however, that safety belts have 
been conclusively proved to be a signifi-
cant factor in the reduction of the carnage 
on our highways. Safety belts may cause 
some injuries, but it has been shown that 
these occur in the types of collisions in 
which the person would have been more 
seriously injured, or even killed, had belts 
not been used at all. It is indeed unfortu-
nate that the North Carolina court chose 
to ignore these facts. 
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